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Abstract
Residential Mobility and Local Housing Market Differences
This paper extends previous literature on variations in mobility rates
across local housing markets by examining the linkage of mobility rates at
the household level to the structure of local housing markets. The results
indicate that residential mobility rates differ widely across local housing
markets, substantiating the view that residential relocation is intimately in-
tertwined with conditions at the local level. Local housing market conditions
also have different effects on mobility rates for renters and owner-occupiers.
The results show that variation in residential mobility rates across hous-
ing markets can be partly explained by level of urbanization, the tenure
structure, the degree of government intervention, and the size of the hous-
ing market. Remarkably, these differences in local housing markets cannot
be seen to be related to housing market features only. The results sug-
gest that differences can also be attributed to the behavior or attitude of
households with respect to housing.
1 Introduction
Residential mobility is an issue which has attracted considerable attention
over the years. Clearly, variations in residential mobility rates are impor-
tant for a number of reasons. It is increasingly recognized that mobility
rates may well have implications for the social stability of urban neighbor-
hoods. Since housing supply is relatively inelastic in the short run, changes
in neighborhoods arise mainly from shifts in the composition of the popula-
tion. In short, changes in the composition of this population are determined
by changes within the existing population, as people grow older, as well as
by changes of the population, as people move residence. Residential mo-
bility, which varies widely with characteristics of the household, is thus one
of the key factors in the demographic dynamics of the neighborhood. Also,
residential mobility is important for the functioning of the local housing and
labor market (cf. Cameron and Muellbauer, 1998; Whitehead, 1999). Res-
idential mobility is the mechanism through which the household generally
adjusts its housing consumption. Generally, this generates a vacancy chain
which may lead to a better aggregate matching process in terms of housing
consumption relative to housing needs (cf. Dieleman et al., 2000). Residen-
tial moves of households to bigger dwellings give newly forming households
and those housed unsatisfactorily the possibility to enter the housing market
or improve their residence, respectively. Hence, restrictions on residential
mobility have strong implications for the local housing market, and may also
be an important source of mismatches and other inefficiencies in the labor
market (Hughes and McCormick, 1987; Henley, 1998; Meen and Andrew,
1998).
This process of residential relocation is thus embedded in, and influenced
by, the housing market conditions at the local level. The structure of local
housing markets, including local land-use regulations for new construction,
allocation rules, or geographical factors, all have a great impact on residen-
tial mobility through the number of offers and the average housing market
price (cf. Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Housing market mobility and housing
market choices are set within the local economy which differ from region to
region.
In the empirical research on residential mobility most emphasis has been
on the demand side, dealing with how choices relate to households’ prefer-
ences and stages in the life course (cf. Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Changes
in household composition and or job location all affect the probability of
moving. The literature on the interplay between residential mobility and
the structure of local housing markets is much less extensive (see for a re-
cent review, Dieleman et al., 2000). Although earlier results find evidence
of regional differences in households’ residential mobility rates (see Clark et
al., 1986; Clark and Dieleman, 1996; Meen, 1999), systematic analyses of
these differences and their underlying causes, have been rare, or are based
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on a quite limited set of housing markets (cf. Dieleman et al., 2000). Never-
theless, it is possible to draw some inferences about the underlying causes.
Among the most important contextual factors are the tenure structure of
the housing stock and the influence of government regulation of housing (Lee
et al, 1994; Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Although the effects of government
interventions in housing markets are hard to measure on the national level
because they vary widely by municipality, Strassmann (1991) indicates that
government intervention has the effect of lowering residential mobility. The
effects of local housing allocation rules, which most directly influence hous-
ing choice and mobility by allocating housing units to specific households,
however, are not very well understood (Clark and Dieleman, 1996).
The research reported here serves to elaborate on the role of housing
market conditions. It is the interplay between residential mobility at the
household level and the local housing market conditions which is at the
centre of this paper. How can we understand these differences in residential
mobility rates between households? Do local housing market conditions lead
to significant differences in residential mobility rates? What housing market
factors are important in explaining these differences? To do this we focus on
differences in residential mobility rates at the level of individual households
across local housing markets. In the empirical analysis, we first consider
whether differences in residential mobility between local housing markets
exist, after which we consider what housing market features determine these
differences in residential mobility rates.
2 Why Households Move
Why households move is of great importance for our understanding of who
moves. This has been studied in particular by sociologists (see Rossi, 1955).
Although household motives for residential mobility are just one side of the
coin, they nevertheless give important insights into the decisions made, and
the triggers leading to a residential move.
Generally, residential mobility is associated with specific changes in house-
holds, changes in housing, and changes in the housing market. Basically, as
formulated in the seminal work of Rossi (1955), all these triggers lead to
changes in housing needs. Traditionally, empirical analyses have linked res-
idential choice (Deurloo et al., 1987) and residential mobility (Clark et al.,
1986, Clark and Withers, 1999) to stages in the family life course. Also, the
effects of job changes, the loss of a job and a spell of unemployment on resi-
dential mobility have been examined (Van Ommeren et al., 1999, Clark and
Withers, 1999). Changes in households are probably the most important
reason why families move. Over time, a number of different changes may
take place (simultaneously), concerning relationships, and household size.
Households are formed but may also break up, experience income growth
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but perhaps also a period of unemployment or a change in job location.
Housing needs generally vary with these stages in the households’ life course
(Clark et al., 1996). Since changes in housing consumption are usually as-
sociated with moves, households may eliminate the gap between actual and
desired levels of housing consumption by moving (cf. Hanushek and Quigley,
1979; Van der Vlist et al., 2001).
From earlier contributions in the literature, we know that these stages
in the life course of households can be summarized by the age of the head,
the size of the household and the amount of space in the dwelling (Deur-
loo et al., 1987; Mulder, 1993; Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Some empirical
findings suggests that residential mobility decreases monotonically with age
(Clark et al., 1986) although others report a non-monotonic relationship
(Pickles and Davies, 1991). Variables relating to space, like the number of
rooms and the dwelling type, seem to decrease residential mobility. Clark
et al.(1986) report that household size, and thus space needs, vary over the
life course, with increasing needs in the early stages but decreasing needs in
later stages. Thus, young households tend to move more often if the house is
small, whereas when they become older they tend to move more if the house
is large. Other variables relating indirectly to the life course, such as income,
assets, occupation, and education, turn out to play a critical role, although
structural differences exist between the rental and owner-occupier sector of
the housing market. For example, income, which is important in explaining
residential mobility in the owner-occupier market, is actually less important
in explaining residential mobility in the rental sector. As expected, wealthier
households in owner-occupied units are more likely to move because they are
less likely to be credit-constrained. On average, mobility rates in the rental
sector are higher than in the owner-occupier sector. These lower mobility
rates of owner-occupiers has usually been ascribed to a greater commit-
ment to the neighborhood, higher moving costs, and greater flexibility in
modifying the current house. For both sectors, educational differences in
part explain variation in residential mobility rates. Highly educated work-
ers tend to have higher mobility rates compared with less educated workers
(Van Ommeren, 2000).
Changes within households are, however, not the only reason for mov-
ing residence. Another important reason why households move is formed
by changes in the housing market. The booms and busts of the housing
market in Britain clearly revealed that changes in average house prices af-
fected residential mobility (Henley, 1998). Residential mobility can be for
portfolio reasons in that households change tenure or move up the hous-
ing ladder. Also, households have used residential mobility to release their
equity, i.e. the property value minus mortgages (Henley, 1998). Deurloo
et al.(1987) report that movements of owners are generally more related to
capital accumulation than to any specific housing needs.
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Residential choice and mobility, however, is also embedded in the spa-
tial environment and cannot be fully understood without considering the
housing market circumstances. Basically, observed hazard rates of residen-
tial mobility are the result of both households’ choices and housing market
opportunities. In the first part of this section we have seen that household
needs differ between households, and also vary over the life course. In the
remaining part of this section, we consider how variation in housing mar-
ket characteristics relate to variation in residential mobility rates. Because
the large majority of moves are within the same housing market area, resi-
dential moves are most intimately intertwined with local market conditions
(Dieleman et al., 2000). The number of housing market opportunities that
households receive depend on the local housing market structure like tenure
structure and tightness of the market as well as on government regulations
(Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Dieleman et al. (2000) examine variation in
residential turnover across 27 large metropolitan areas in the US. They argue
that it is critical, in understanding the functioning of local housing markets
in the process of residential relocation, to include the tenure structure in
the analysis. They find that the proportion of rental housing and the size
of the metropolitan area increase residential mobility rates. Also of inter-
est, they find that price levels of both owner-occupied and rental housing
co-vary consistently and are related to the same characteristics which de-
termine the variation in residential mobility. Their results suggest that a
greater proportion of rental housing increases the price of owning.
For the Dutch context, in which the government directly regulates part
of the housing market (both rental and owner-occupier), these effects are less
well understood (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Government intervention, to
which we turn in the next section in more detail, can have various opposite
effects on residential mobility rates. On the one hand, government interven-
tion in Western Europe which has led to a situation where substantial parts
of the housing stock are in the social rental sector, would increase residential
mobility. Because of the lower quality of social rental units households move
from the social rental sector as soon as they can afford an other unit. On
the other hand, government intervention and rent subsidies create benefits
for those not moving, and thus would lower residential mobility (cf. Clark
and Heskin, 1982; Strassman, 1991).
What is clear is that in explaining the observed pattern of residential
mobility due account has to be taken of the motives why households move,
and the specific possibilities of those who move. In consequence, households
may have identical patterns of residential mobility but different underlying
reasons, or may have the same underlying reason but different patterns of
residential mobility. In practice, therefore, patterns of residential mobility
may be quite diffuse and hard to relate to household characteristics only.
Differences in local allocation rules, in housing market size and urbanization
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degree are also very likely to lead to variation in the residential mobility rates
of households.
3 Housing Policy
Before turning to the empirical application, the peculiarities of the Dutch
housing market policy and its implications for observed patterns of residen-
tial mobility will now be described in more detail, with special attention to
the local housing allocation rules in The Netherlands.
The current system of government intervention, either by local or cen-
tral government, found its origin in the post-World War II reconstruction
period. After the Second World War, the housing shortage was enormous,
which led the government to set rents and initiate strictly planned, large-
scale construction of subsidized housing. Although the most urgent housing
shortage was relieved in the late 1950s, the central government kept the
same housing policy in the 1960s and 1970s as during the reconstruction
phase (cf. Van der Schaar, 1987). All this has led to a rapid expansion of
the public renting sector, whereby the private renting sector almost disap-
peared. During the 1980s and 1990s housing policy gradually changed to a
more market-oriented system which exists today (cf. Feddes, 1995).
In the 1980s, it gradually became clear that this housing policy, aimed at
providing affordable housing, was no longer necessary or desirable (Priemus,
1996). The subsidies weighed heavily on the national budget. Also, the late
1980s showed that the large-scale construction of subsidized housing after
the Second World War, had led to a one-sided housing stock, dominated by
uniform large, inexpensive family dwellings. As a consequence, subsidized
construction was gradually abolished during the 1990s and replaced by a lo-
cal housing policy, where local authorities, housing corporations and market
parties cooperate.
Besides initiating new construction of both subsidized rented accom-
modation and owner-occupied dwellings, the central government intervened
with rent controls and rent assistance programs (cf. Van der Schaar and
Hereijgers, 1991). During the 1990s, major changes took also place in the
rental sector (Priemus, 1996). Most public, locally-controlled rental agencies
were transformed into private, non-profit housing corporations. Rents may
now be set freely by the landlord within a certain range, depending on the
dwellings’ amenities. Also, in a large number of cities, waiting lists for rental
units have been gradually replaced by a system under which households can
apply for vacant rental units, whose allocation among eligible households
depends on their search/waiting period.
These allocation rules play an important role in Dutch housing policy;
regulating the entry into and the movements within local housing markets.
The main reason for these rules, the local authorities argue, is to attempt
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to prevent mismatches (in terms of income or household size) and to reserve
part of the housing stock for locals wishing to enter the housing market or for
those working in the local community. Also, this system of allocation rules
is to provide affordable housing to those who need it most, and to stimulate
residential mobility of households no longer eligible for those units (cf. Van
der Schaar and Hereijgers, 1991). Regardless of the submarket - public
rental, private rental, the existing owner-occupied stock or new construction
- a complex system of allocation rules exists. Although local rules may differ
locally, the most important allocation rules can be summarized as:
• Rental sector: social stock
To obtain a rental unit in the social sector, households must often
comply with stringent, unit-dependent eligibility rules, in terms of a
maximum income and a minimum number of household members. In
addition, households must either live or work in the local community.
Once a household has obtained a housing unit, it cannot be forced to
move as eligibility rules no longer hold.
• Rental sector: private market
Beyond a certain rent, anybody is free to move into a rental unit.
• Owner-occupier sector: existing housing stock
To buy a unit in the owner-occupier sector, households are relatively
free in their choice. However, below a certain price threshold, which
may vary among local communities, households must live or work in
the local community. Transaction costs are highest in this submarket.
In addition to search costs and solicitor’s costs, all transactions are
subject to a 6% tax paid by the buyer.
• Owner-occupier sector: new construction
Like in the social rental sector, households must often comply with
very stringent eligibility rules in order to obtain a newly constructed
dwelling. In some cases, however, no eligibility rules exist. In most
cases, households must live or work in the local community, and some-
times an income maximum is set as well. Recall that most new res-
idential construction sites are designated by the central government.
As the number of newly constructed units is limited, allocation rules
exist which allocate these units randomly to eligible households. In-
dividual lots are hardly ever available for sale, and, if available, local
government rules regarding dwelling type and construction materials
have to be obeyed.
It does not need much imagination to understand that these allocation
rules may affect housing consumption as well as local patterns of residential
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mobility. Especially in the Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam and
Utrecht, and the area between them, eligibility rules are most stringent
and most likely affect mobility rates. Of course, in housing markets with
an abundant supply of dwellings these rules may be less strict, enabling
households from other local markets to enter the market more easily. In fact,
households wishing to move between different local housing markets have
greater difficulty obtaining a dwelling. In general, a household, wishing to
move to a housing market in which it does not work, is only eligible for a unit
of the existing owner-occupier sector (above the local price threshold) or the
free-market rental housing stock. Usually, for households in a social rental
unit who are no longer eligible for the social rental sector, residential mobility
is associated with a steep rise in their housing outlay. In consequence,
households think twice before they move out of their unit, and may hence
stay in a unit which is actually no longer intended for them (Clark and
Heskin, 1991). The share of social rental housing is thus an important
feature of the local housing market structure, and provides a good indicator
of the importance of allocation rules in the operation of the local housing
market. Also, because these rules vary by municipal, government regulation
may as well explain the variation in mobility rates across space.
4 Data
In the empirical analysis we make use of the Dutch Housing Demand Survey
(WBO)(cf. CBS, 1995a,b). A random sample of all officially registered
individuals in the Netherlands of 18 years and older are asked to participate
in this survey. From a total of 11,739,174 individuals of at least 18 years
old, 84,326 were asked to participate in the 1993/94 WBO, of whom 74.5%
actually participated.
The 1994 survey contains extensive information on a cross-section of
Dutch housing and households (see also Van der Vlist, 2001). It contains in-
formation on features of the current occupied dwelling, the former occupied
dwelling, and of the household itself, such as the number of household mem-
bers, their employment status, commuting distance, dwelling type, tenure,
rent or mortgage, and income. Particularly important for the empirical
analysis of residential mobility is the fact that it also includes length of
current residence, and retrospective information on the length of former pe-
riods of residence. These residential durations are measured in years, and
sometimes even in periods of 5 years, so that basically we have grouped or
interval data on residential durations. Figure 4 illustrates the four types of
residential history that could be constructed from our data set. Note that,
since the current spell is ongoing at the time of the questionnaire, right-
censoring occurs because the destination is unknown. These (left- or right-)
censored cases are indicated in the figure by a question mark.
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Figure 1: Residential duration data
For the first type of households that did not move during 1990-1994, in
total 40,251 observations, the elapsed duration is known. For the second
group who moved once during 1990-1994, in total 13,474 observations, we
have a left-censored spell of which the residual duration is known, and a
second, right-censored, spell. For the case of two transitions (2,354 observa-
tions); or three transitions or more (757 observations) a left-censored spell,
one, two or three completed spells, and a right-censored spell are known,
respectively. In the empirical analysis reported in this paper we use the
information on the current residence. For this only those observations are
selected for which the participant is the principal occupant of the dwelling.
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for our sample.
As the table shows, shares for families either with or without children
are highest. The descriptive statistics also show that the sample is basically
representative for the Dutch housing market in terms of tenure, dwelling
type and region.
In the WBO Survey, households who moved in the 1990-1994 period
(14176 observations) were also asked about their most important reason of
the most recent move. We summarized these answers by distinguishing be-
tween four main categories. In this, household and family-related reasons
refer to residential mobility reasons of marriage and divorce, household size
and composition, and health. Labor and occupation-related reasons refer to
reasons of a change in job location or occupation, whereas housing-related
reasons refer to reasons of tenure, housing outlay, and dwelling type. Fi-
nally, there are commuting reasons referring to the length of the journey to
work. Table 2 summarizes this information. The figures in the table indicate
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the 1994 WBO-sample
Household Characteristics Spatial Characteristics
one person household .16 social housing .38
head with child .03 highly urbanized .366
head and partner .36 urbanized .190
head and partner with child .44 rural .444
multiple household .01 North Netherlands .131
household size 2.72 Groningen .048
age of head (years) 46.2 Friesland .041
Dwelling characteristics Drenthe .043
detached house .16 East Netherlands .204
semi-detached house .14 Overijssel .078
corner house .15 Gelderland .109
terraced house .31 Flevoland .016
apartment .23 West Netherlands .446
number of rooms 4.2 Noord-Holland .137
renter .47 Utrecht .068
owner-occupier .53 Zeeland .034
rent (Dfl./month) 553.3 Zuid-Holland .209
potential selling price (Dfl. x 1000) 225 South Netherlands .219
Labor market characterstics Noord-Brabant .136
unemployed .05 Limburg .082
not-in-labor-force .28 Education
student .01 lower vocational .44
employed .59 intermediate vocational .30
self-employed .07 higher vocational/university .26
commuting distance (kms) 17.2
income (Dfl. x 1000) 55.57
Table 2: Most important reason of moving residence
share
household and family-related reasons 0.38
labor and occupation-related reasons 0.08
commuting distance 0.05
housing-related reasons 0.50
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that housing-related reasons are by far the most important one. From the
discussion in Section 2 we know that these housing-related reasons are also
generally related to household and family-related reasons. This figure is in
sharp contrast to the 5 percent who indicated that they moved for reasons
connected with the length of the commute.
5 Model Specification and Estimation
5.1 Proportional Hazard Model
In the econometric analysis of the residential mobility rates of households,
we analyze the sojourn time of the household in the dwelling. These transi-
tion rates, or hazard rates, represent the probability that a household, which
has occupied a residence for a time t leaves it in the short interval of length
dt after t (cf. Lancaster, 1990). The differences in transition rates are re-
lated to differences in housing market opportunities and in the housing price,
and to differences in households’ preferences. Because households’ prefer-
ences vary over the family life course, these are also of great importance
for understanding who moves. In the reduced-form approach, we ascribe
differences in residential duration to different household, housing and hous-
ing market characteristics. In the remainder of this section, we formulate a
simple single-spell proportional hazard model of residential mobility. A gen-
eral specification for the proportional hazard model of residential mobility
is given by:
θ(t;x) = ψ(t)θ(x), (1)
where ψ(t) is a flexible baseline hazard; and where θ(x) is the systematic
part of the hazard (Lancaster, 1990). The baseline hazard gives the shape
of the hazard function for any individual, whereas the systematic part gives
the level of the observed hazard. Because the baseline hazard gives informa-
tion regarding residential duration dependence, we will instead of estimating
a Cox model, estimate the baseline hazard jointly with the parameters of
interest. We take a piecewise-constant baseline hazard, to let the data sug-
gest the form of the duration dependence structure, rather than imposing
it a priori. As is well known, this prevents misspecification of the duration
dependence structure, and substantially reduces the potential bias in the
parameters of interest (cf. Ridder, 1987).
The piecewise-constant hazard divides the time axis into M intervals
(m = 1..M), with discrete changes at the points c1, c2, ..cM−1, with c0 and
cM =∞. Let:
ψm(t) =
{
ψm
0
if
cm−1 ≤ t < cm
otherwise
. (2)
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Then, for θi(x) = exp(x′iβ), the survival function S(t) equals:
S(t) = exp
(
− exp (x′iβ) exp(ψm)(t− cm−1)− m−1∑
i=1
exp
(
x′iβ
)
exp(ψm) (cm − cm−1)
)
,
(3)
and the mean duration equals (cf. Murphy, 1996):
E(t) =
M∑
m=1
exp
(−x′iβ) exp(−ψm) [1− exp (− exp (x′iβ) exp(ψm) (cm − cm−1))]
×
∏
j<m
exp
(− exp (x′iβ) exp(ψj) (cj − cj−1)) . (4)
From statistical theory, it is known that the formulation of the likelihood
function depends not only on the statistical formulation of the transition
process but also on the sampling scheme (cf. Ridder, 1984, or Lancaster,
1990). Stock sampling refers to sampling households at a fixed point in time,
whereas flow sampling refers to sampling the flow of households who enter
the housing market during a certain interval of time. In both cases, one
would like to identify the distribution of completed durations on the basis of
observed durations. Ridder (1984) shows that, if a sample is drawn from the
flow, we can analyze the sample as if it were a sample of completed durations.
For stock sampling, however, this no longer holds true. Using stock sam-
pling means that durations are ongoing at the moment of the questionnaire
and necessarily right-censored, with short spells underrepresented. Also,
if complete housing market histories, i.e. initial conditions, are unknown,
this necessitates the assumption of a stationary housing market. From the
description of the data in Section 4, it is clear that the 1994 sample used
in the empirical analysis of this paper is a stock sample. Given the stock
sampling scheme, we take account of right-censoring, and of length-bias by
conditioning on the mean when formulating the likelihood. The likelihood
then equals:
lnL(ϑ) = lnS(t)− lnE(t), (5)
which parameter vector ϑ is estimated using Maximum Likelihood methods.
In the specification of the proportional hazard model, we follow the dis-
cussion of Section 2, and include controls to capture the household’s housing
needs, and local housing market features. Also following the discussion, we
estimate models for the rental and owner-occupier sector separately. Be-
cause we do not follow households over time, nor do we have information on
the changes which occur through time, we relate elapsed duration to proxies
related to the life course (see similarly Mulder, 1993). The most important
factors relating to housing needs are: age, household characteristics, and
household size. In addition, level of education of the head, occupational
status, commuting distance, income and assets are included. Following the
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literature, we also allow for interaction among age, household size, and the
number of rooms. Housing features, like dwelling type and the number of
rooms, are included as proxies for housing space (cf. Clark et al., 1986). In
the empirical analysis, we determine first whether the hazard of residential
mobility differs among local housing markets, after which we try to relate
these differences to local housing market features. We use the share of social
rental housing as a measure of housing market control by allocation rules,
and the total number of dwellings as a measure of the size of the market.
Also, because the share of social rental housing is correlated with the level of
urbanization, we determine the effect of housing market features for different
levels of urbanization.
5.2 Estimation Results
This section offers the estimation results for the hazard model of residential
mobility for both the rental and the owner-occupier market. The analysis
and the discussion of the results aims to shed light on the interplay between
residential mobility rates at the household level and local housing market
conditions. How to understand the variation in residential mobility rates
across housing markets and between households? What housing market
factors are important in explaining differences between housing markets?
Table 3 gives estimation results and t-values for a subsample of the
rental market and the owner-occupier market, with associated estimates for
local housing market dummies presented in Appendix A. Reference cases are
indicated by (-). Positive values of the parameters indicate that an increase
in the value of the regressor is associated with a higher hazard rate, and
thus a shorter length of stay.
Our estimation results reveal that, even after controlling for dwelling
characteristics, household characteristics and labor market status, differ-
ences between local housing markets still exist and can be quite large. Also,
there seems to exist a distinctive geography of residential mobility in local
housing markets, with lower mobility rates in the core regions than in the
regions at the periphery. The results thus indicate that local housing market
factors may at least explain part of the variation in residential mobility rates
of households. It also shows that the impact on the hazard rate may be large
relative to other, that is housing and household-related, factors. This result
is consistent with the finding of Clark et al.(1986), who analyzed differences
in mobility rates between four regions. Our results extends this finding, in-
dicating that the variation in households’ residential mobility rates between
local housing markets within the same region can be substantial. The rea-
son for this is that, because households move over short distances, generally
within the same local housing market, especially local market conditions and
allocation rules matter. Because allocation rules most likely have a different
effect on mobility rates for renters and owner-occupiers it is no surprise that
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Table 3: Results for the stock data proportional hazard model of residential
mobility
Rental Owner
estimate t-value estimate t-value
age (/100) -19.51 -17 -23.7 -13.5
head -0.14 -0.23 -0.92 -9.6
head+child -0.23 -2.58 -0.61 -3.8
head+partner - - - -
head+partner+child -0.18 -2.40 -0.21 -3.3
multiple households -0.64 -3.46 -2.75 -5.1
household size / 10 -0.43 -0.62 -0.51 -0.5
number of rooms 0.16 2.94 -0.23 -2.8
detached house -0.64 -3.46 -0.82 -7.8
semi-detached house -0.54 -5.3 -0.32 -3.3
corner house -0.23 -3.54 -0.28 -2.9
terraced house -0.26 -4.8 -0.37 -4.1
apartment - - - -
self-employed -0.27 -2.91 -0.04 -0.7
employee - - - -
unemployed 0.27 3.95 -0.01 -0.1
not-in-labor force 0.18 2.63 0.10 1.2
student -0.01 -0.16 -0.04 -1.3
low vocational -0.08 -1.88 -0.20 -4.7
intermediate vocational - - - -
high vocational and university 0.14 2.66 0.18 4.2
commuting distance (one-way/100) 0.12 0.97 0.31 3.3
ln(income/1000) -0.05 -2.40 0.08 3.5
assets/1000 -0.004 -0.63 0.001 0.4
age×household size 2.43 1.64 1.16 0.6
age×number of rooms -1.02 -8.31 0.17 1.0
age×age 13.10 13.96 10.7 7.0
ln(potential selling price/1000) - - 0.86 15.4
ln(monthly rent) 1.25 19.86 - -
Baseline hazard
ψ1 : t ≤ 9 year -1.51 -3.3 0.40 0.7
ψ2 : 10 < t ≤ 17 year 0.58 1.2 2.54 4.1
ψ3 : 17 < t ≤ 25 year 0.97 1.9 3.05 4.8
ψ4 : 25 < t ≤ 38 year 2.16 4.4 4.03 6.4
ψ5 : t > 38 year 2.95 5.8 4.79 7.5
Number of observations 11231 13277
Log-likelihood -35744 -43416
+ 46 local housing market dummies
(see Appendix A)
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differences in local market conditions have a different effect on mobility rates
of renters and owner-occupiers (see also Clark and Dieleman, 1996). At the
end of this section, we return to these local housing market differences in
mobility rates.
Earlier in this paper we already pointed out that the most important
reason of why households move are related to housing needs, that is, house-
hold and family-related reasons and housing-related reasons. In general, the
results indicate that residential mobility depends negatively on the utility
experienced from the dwelling, confirming the importance of housing-related
reasons of moving residence as reported in Table 2. Compared with apart-
ments, the hazard rate in terraced houses is lower, as people tend to stay
longer in terraced or (semi-) detached dwellings. The number of rooms
also show the presence of structural differences between renters and owner-
occupiers. This is confirmed by the effect income has on mobility rates.
The results indicate that rising income increases mobility rates of owner-
occupiers, whereas it decreases mobility rates of renters. A reason for this
finding is that, because credit-constraints play a very important role in the
owner-occupier sector of the housing market (cf. Aldershof, 1999), increases
in income, assets and in the potential selling price, all make the household
less credit-constrained, and thus lead to an increase in mobility rates. For
renters it is the housing cost that plays the decisive role. Hence, for them,
increases in income may then make the household no longer eligible for a
dwelling from the social rental market, leading to a sharp increase in hous-
ing cost. Because these households cannot be forced to move out of their
existing unit, they may decide to stay in this cheaper unit, which results in
lower mobility rates (cf. Clark and Heskin, 1982).
In conformity with expectations, household characteristics indicating
stages in the life course play an important role in explaining the variation
in residential mobility rates. Age, which is generally seen as the most im-
portant proxy for different stages in the life course, turns out to negatively
affect the hazard rate (for similar findings, see Clark et al., 1986; or Mulder,
1993). In contrast to Clark et al.(1986), we find evidence of a non-monotonic
relation between age and residential mobility (see also Davies and Pickles,
1991; Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Our results indicate that residential mo-
bility rates decrease with age, but at a lower rate with increasing age (as
indicated by age squared). Young people, however, tend to move much more
frequently than older people. Another factor indirectly related to the house-
hold’s life course is housing space, as measured by the number of rooms (cf.
Clark et al., 1986). Unexpectedly at first sight, we find a positive effect of
the number of rooms, and a negative effect of the interaction of age with the
number of rooms on mobility rates in the rental market. Possible reasons for
this finding are that younger households in the larger rental units move away
from the rental sector to the owner-occupier sector of the housing market,
e.g. for portfolio reasons. Earlier results, for which we pooled the rental and
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owner-occupier market, indicated a strong and significant negative effect on
residential mobility in general (see also, Clark, 1992). Others argue that it
is not so much space that determines residential mobility, but rather the ac-
tual number of rooms relative to the required number of rooms (see Pickles
and Davies, 1985). Their results, however, also suggest that the effect of
space on the hazard rate of residential mobility depends on the transition
type. For transitions from renting to owner-occupation, and from owner-
occupation to renting, they find a statistically significant, positive effect of
space on residential mobility. For transitions within the rental or owner-
occupier sector of the housing market, they find a statistically significant,
negative effect on residential mobility.
Labor and occupation-related reasons of moving residence which turned
out to be less important (see Table 2) nevertheless explain a substantial
part of the variation in mobility rates between households. Similar to other
findings in the literature, we find that the highly educated have much higher
mobility rates than those with lower or intermediate vocational education
(see also Van Ommeren, 2000). In addition, at least for the owner-occupiers,
commuting distance has a positive and significant effect on the hazard rate
of moving (see similarly Van Ommeren, 2000).
In the introduction to this paper we argued that the process of residential
relocation is embedded in, and influenced by, the housing market conditions
at the local level. In the analysis reported thus far we considered variation in
residential mobility across housing markets without determining the housing
market features that explain these differences. The question naturally arises
as to what determines these differences in mobility rates. This issue is
considered in the remaining part of this section, where we determine the
effect of housing market features1. We analyze the impact of three important
features of the local housing market. First, we estimate models for different
levels of urbanization (of the city) by rental and owner-occupier sectors of
the housing market separately. Also, we include the share of social rental
housing in the analysis as a measure of governement intervention. Finally, we
consider the size of the housing market by including the number of housing
units in the analysis. Other important housing market features, like the
average house price, are basically determined by the tenure structure of the
housing market (cf. Clark and Dieleman, 1996; Dieleman et al., 2000), and
1As is well known, relating the behavior of individuals or households to aggregate
market characteristics is not an easy task (cf. Manski, 1995). Manski points out that the
presence of endogenous effects means that the individual behaves in a way that depends on
the prevalence of that behavior in the neighborhood or local housing market. Alternatively,
contextual effects may be present, where the aggregate behavior of the neighborhood is
determined by the endogenous composition of that neighborhood. To avoid this, we in
this paper consider local housing market factors which are exogenous; influenced neither
by individual households nor by the composition of the local housing market, so that both
endogenous and contextual effects are not likely to be present.
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therefore not included in the empirical analysis. In Table 4 we report these
results (highly urbanized areas (HU ) urbanized areas (U ) and rural areas
(R)), by rental (r) and owner-occupier (o) sectors of the housing market.
Reference cases are again indicated with (-), with ∗ indicating significance
at the 5% level and ∗∗ at the 10% level.
The differences in local housing markets can not be seen to be related
to the share of social rental housing and the total housing stock only. Our
results suggest that an important difference in local mobility rates is deter-
mined by differences in the degree of urbanization. Generally, these differ-
ences are attributed to differences in households, housing stock and other
local housing market factors. Our results show that age, household size
and composition have different effects on mobility rates between highly ur-
banized and rural areas. Thus, variations in mobility rates with respect to
different levels of urbanization are the result of differences not only in, for
example age, but also in behavior and attitudes with respect to housing.
For instance, households in highly urbanized areas may attach more value
to amenities like a theatre than to having a garden or a garage (see the dis-
cussion in Mulder, 1993, who considers moves to and from the four biggest
cities in the Netherlands). Also, as has been argued by Clark and Dieleman
(1996), government intervention may affect housing preferences through the
tenure structure of a housing market.
Regarding the local housing market factors, our results indicate that the
share of social rental housing has a positive effect on residential mobility
in urbanized housing markets, but does not affect residential mobility rates
in rural areas. This may suggest that government intervention by means
of allocation rules in and by itself does not decrease residential mobility of
households, rather facilitate the matching process of housing and households.
One of the main reasons why the share of (social) rental housing increases
residential mobility is that it affects the ability to move to ownership (Clark
and Dieleman, 1996). Dieleman et al. (2000) argue that much of the moves
in local housing markets is generated by moves within and from the rental
housing sector (both social and private rental). Also, social renters wishing
to move but no longer eligible for the social rental market, will generally
enter the owner-occupier sector of the housing market. This supports our
finding that in highly regulated housing markets as urban housing markets
typically are, with shares of social rental housing up to 55%, residential
mobility rates are high in both rental and owner-occupier sectors of the
housing market. From this perspective, differences in residential mobility
rates between housing markets indeed arise because of differences in the
tenure structure and the degree of government intervention across housing
markets.
Another important factor which could explain differences between local
housing markets is the size of the housing market denoted as housing stock.
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Table 4: Results for the stock data proportional hazard model for different
levels of urbanization
HUr HUo Ur Uo Rr Ro
age (/100) -12.23∗ -31.28∗ -14.48∗ -20.51∗ -19.35∗ -21.14∗
head -0.06 -0.28∗ 0.04 -0.40∗ -0.21∗ -1.36∗
head+child -0.16∗ -1.14∗ -0.57∗ -0.07 -0.09 -1.28∗
head+partner - – - - - -
head+partner+child -0.12∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.16 -0.18∗∗ -0.31∗ -0.15∗
multiple households -0.75∗ -2.19∗ -0.28 -2.60∗ -1.63∗ -2.12∗
household size -1.07∗∗ -8.49∗ -1.10 2.65∗∗ 2.14∗ 3.90∗
number of rooms 0.15∗ 0.05 0.54∗ -0.21∗∗ 0.25∗ -0.18∗
detached house -0.04 -0.30∗ -0.88∗ -1.01∗ -0.92∗ -1.04∗
semi-detached -0.12 -0.19∗∗ -0.30∗∗ -0.64∗ -0.85∗ -0.81∗
corner house -0.20∗ -0.12 -0.20∗ -0.68∗ -0.51∗ -0.74∗
terraced house -0.08∗∗ -0.20∗ -0.17∗ -0.63∗ -0.56∗ -0.87∗
apartment - - - - - -
self-employed -0.17∗ -0.02 -0.29∗ -0.28∗ -0.06 -0.11∗∗
employee - - - - - -
unemployed 0.20∗ 0.28 0.26∗ 0.09 0.40∗ 0.10
not-in-labor force 0.14∗ -0.003 0.05 0.04 0.28∗ 0.06
student -0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07∗
low vocational 0.11∗ -0.14∗ -0.04 -0.23∗ -0.32∗ -0.37∗
intermediate vocational - - - - - -
high vocational / university 0.28∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.10 0.11∗∗ 0.09 0.27∗
commuting distance (/100) -0.05 -0.18 -0.43∗ 0.23∗∗ -0.03 0.49∗
ln(income/1000) -0.13∗ 0.11∗ -0.07∗∗ 0.19∗ -0.010 0.03
assets (/1000) 0.0003 0.001 -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.003
age × household size 4.62∗ 17.77∗ 3.29 -4.14 -4.17∗ -9.03∗
age × number of rooms -0.95∗ -0.51∗ -1.91∗ 0.05 -1.13∗ 0.13
age × age 6.17∗ 16.95∗ 12.58∗ 9.75∗ 14.43∗ 10.90∗
ln(potential selling price) - 0.79∗ - 1.10∗ - 0.48∗
ln(monthly rent) 1.02∗ - 1.47∗ - 1.35∗ -
local housing market features
share of social rental housing -0.25 0.96∗ 1.42∗ 2.14∗ -0.17 0.43
ln(housing stock/1000) -0.03 0.07 -0.14∗ -0.04 0.07 0.03
Baseline hazard
ψ1 : t ≤ 9 year -4.87∗ 1.27∗∗ -8.00∗ -3.41∗ -6.20∗ 0.77
ψ2 : 9 < t ≤ 17 year -3.07∗ 3.63∗ -6.06∗ -1.32 -4.21∗ 2.83∗
ψ2 : 17 < t ≤ 25 year -3.22∗ 4.53∗ -5.96∗ -0.81 -4.23∗ 3.40∗
ψ2 : 25 < t ≤ 38 year -2.06∗ 5.19∗ -4.80∗ 0.31 -2.39∗ 4.42∗
ψ2 : t > 38 year -1.21∗ 5.98∗ -3.61∗ 0.54 -1.40∗ 5.20∗
Number of observations 12231 7156 4659 5206 8583 14346
Log-likelihood -38560 -22847 -14718 -16926 -27820 -47656
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The results, however, indicate hardly any statistical effect of the total hous-
ing stock. The usual theoretical justification is that, because most moves are
within the same local housing market, those households in larger markets
have more possibilities to improve on their current dwelling. It might, how-
ever, be that larger markets also lead to a less transparent housing market,
which offsets the increasing possibilities to improve on the current dwelling.
Another explanation is that it is not so much the size of the housing market,
rather the change in the size of the housing market which explains differences
between housing markets (cf. Dieleman et al., 2000).
Also, differences in the labor market concerning, for instance, the number
of local jobs available, may explain differences in residential mobility rates
across housing markets. Moreover, in highly urbanized areas, good and
efficient public transportation is generally available, which, together with
the existence of employment centers in or near metropolitan areas, may also
explain why long commuting distances do not increase residential mobility
in highly urbanized housing markets. It should be noted, however, that
commuting distances are likely to be small in these areas. Nevertheless, if
commuting were to be measured in terms of travel time, then, because of
congestion, the true picture may be quite the opposite. For this to conclude,
however, even more in-depth modeling is necessary as to relate differences in
residential mobility rates across local housing markets to these local housing
and labor market features.
6 Conclusion
Residential mobility is one of the key factors in the demographic dynamics
of the neighborhood and important for the functioning of the local housing
and labor market. This process of residential choice and mobility are, in
turn, intimately related to local circumstances. Analyzing the determinants
of residential duration may lead to valuable information about residential
mobility, and the possibilities for public policies to affect residential moving
behavior. This paper addresses the interplay between residential mobility
at the household level and local housing market conditions.
Our analysis showed large differences in residential mobility rates be-
tween households and across local housing markets. In general, residential
mobility is thought to be triggered by changes in the family life course and
related changes in housing demand, or labor market changes. We have con-
centrated on all these factors, taking account of the variation in mobility
rates across different local housing markets. Regarding spatial variation
in residential mobility rates, it turns out that there are substantial differ-
ences between local housing market dynamics, with high mobility rates in
some housing markets and low mobility rates in other housing markets.
The analysis also showed that local housing market conditions have differ-
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ent effects on mobility rates for renters and owner-occupiers, where in some
local markets conditions decrease mobility of renters but increase mobility
of owner-occupiers. Moreover, there seems to exist a distinctive geography
of residential mobility in local housing markets, with lower mobility rates in
the core regions than in the regions at the periphery.
The analysis also indicated that housing markets in urbanized areas func-
tion differently compared rural areas. As we had expected, housing demand
and life course effects still seem to be important determinants in residential
mobility. Yet, our results show that age, household size and composition
have different effects on mobility rates between (highly) urbanized and rural
areas. Thus, variations in residential mobility rates across urban and rural
housing markets are the result of differences not only in, for example age,
but also in behavior and attitudes with respect to housing.
Moreover, differences in residential mobility rates can be related to differ-
ences in the local structure of the housing market, the degree of government
intervention (as measured through the share of social rental housing) and
the size of the housing market. The results revealed that the share of social
rental housing increases residential mobility in urbanized housing markets,
but does not affect residential mobility rates in rural areas. In general, much
of the moves in local housing markets is generated by moves within and from
the rental housing stock, leading to higher mobility rates in markets with a
large rental stock. Also, in regulated housing markets with stringent allo-
cation rules and high shares of social rental housing, residential mobility is
more often associated with a transition to the owner-occupier sector. So in
highly regulated housing markets as urbanized areas typically are, this lead
to higher mobility rates in both housing market sectors than in rural areas.
The size of the housing stock, however, did not turn out to be an impor-
tant determinant of the variation in residential mobility across local housing
markets. This suggests that it is not the size of the housing stock, rather
the change in the size of the housing stock which explains differences in
mobility across space. More research on this topic, however, is needed in or-
der to better comprehend the interplay between residential mobility and the
local housing market structure, to fully understand what determines high
residential mobility rates in some housing markets while low mobility rates
in other markets. Also, more research is needed to understand the exact
nature of the distinctive geography of residential mobility in local housing
markets with, in large, lower mobility rates in the core regions than in the
regions at the periphery.
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A Estimation Results for Local Housing Market
Dummies
Rental Market Owner Market
Ommelanden Groningen - -
Groningen City -0.32∗∗ -0.36
Northern Friesland -0.03 -0.02
Eastern Friesland 0.07 -0.29∗
North/Central Drenthe -0.22 -0.01
East/Western Drenthe -0.29∗ -0.12
Almelo City 0.05 -0.43∗
Hengelo/Enschede City -0.30∗ -0.23∗∗
IJssel valley -0.09 -0.33∗
West/Northern Veluwe -0.50∗ -0.57∗
East Veluwe -0.30∗∗ -0.46∗
Achterhoek -0.49∗ -0.90∗
Arnhem area -0.54∗ -0.79∗
Nijmegen area -0.90∗ -0.43∗
Betuwe -0.77∗ -0.47∗
Eastern Utrecht -0.36∗ -0.62∗
Western Utrecht -0.39∗ -0.83∗
Gooi -0.62∗ -1.19∗
Amsterdam -0.75∗ -0.46∗
Zaanstreek -0.31∗∗ -0.65∗
Zuid Kennemerland -0.64∗ -0.37∗
Central Kennemerland -0.63∗ -0.55∗
Amstelland -0.36∗ -0.47∗
Northern part of North-Holland -0.28∗∗ -0.59∗
North Kennemerland -0.03 -0.50∗
Leiden area -0.51∗ -0.83∗
Den Haag -0.46∗ -0.50∗
continued on the next page
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Rental Market Owner Market
Westland -0.82∗ -0.89∗
Rijn Midden Holland/Alblasserwaard -1.19∗ -0.58∗
Drechtsteden/Hoeksewaard -0.56∗ -0.46∗
Rotterdam area (Rijnmond) -0.36∗ -0.37∗
North/Central Zeeland -0.24 -0.24∗∗
Southern Zeeland -0.76∗ -0.40∗
Roosendaal area -0.13 -0.62∗
Breda area -0.43∗ -0.78∗
Central part of North-Brabant -0.42∗ -0.94∗
Den Bosch area -0.33∗∗ -0.90∗
Helmond area -0.29 -0.57∗
Eindhoven area -0.36∗ -0.61∗
North-eastern part of North-Brabant -0.23 -0.92∗
Northern Limburg -0.75∗ -0.68∗
Central Limburg -0.37∗∗ -0.72∗
Eastern Limburg -0.41∗ -0.66∗
Mining area -0.53∗ -0.74∗
Southern Limburg -0.35∗ -0.93∗
Flevoland -0.10 -0.13
- reference case.
∗ significant at the 5 % level.
∗∗ significant at the 10 % level.
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